On Huemer's Skepticism

     In Huemer's first argument on page 156, he says that "In order to know something, I must have a good reason for believing it. This is the premise on which he bases his argument for infinite regression of knowledge. He justifies this premise by saying that "the foundationalist has no way of distinguishing self-evident propositions from merely arbitrary propositions". Essentially, Huemer argues that the foundationalist must find differentiate between a fact that is self-evident (2=2) and a fact that is arbitrary (there is a twelve headed purple dragon living on Venus). He furthers his skeptical argument by doubting criterion for our beliefs and doubting our perceptions of the physical world. In Huemer's argument here, any foundational proposition is self-contradictory and absurd. Our senses are not necessarily accurate, and external objects do not necessarily exist. This argument supports Huemer's thesis that "there is no good reason for thinking anything whatsoever".

     While this argument does appear to be logically sound, Huemer offers no guidelines for how a skeptic should accurately live within his world. Although he has offered a strong argument for not thinking anything whatsoever, how does one live his life from that frame of mind? Human needs for survival and reproduction still exist according to evolutionary principles. Should one instead just sit in a cave their whole life not believing in anything rather than pursuing what evolution deems we should pursue to feel good? Skepticism is a very esoteric set of ideas that makes sense in idealistic terms, but in the form of human lives that are bound by evolutionary restrictions is offers no useful guidelines on how to live. 

     As J.P. Moreland states in answering the skeptic, skepticism is inherently flawed itself because it assumes that its premises count as knowledge. He then proposes an example, "For example, suppose I claim to know that I first visited Disneyland in 1985 and a skeptic points out that it's possible that I'm mistaken. He's right; it is possible. But it doesn't follow that I first visited Disneyland in some year other than 1985, or that I never visited Disneyland at all. Unless the skeptic gives me good reasons to think that I didn't first visit Disneyland in '85, the bare possibility that I might not have isn't sufficient to call into question my claim to know I did." Although a skeptic can always question the possibility that some belief or memory is not real, 
that simple possibility is not necessarily a strong argument, nor is it particularly useful. If a skeptic attacks a

 particularist on the claim that the particularist does not know anything, he is not proposing a rational 

argument. A skeptic does not know anything either. 
     I honestly do not know how Huemer would respond to the argument that skeptics cannot know that skepticism is true, because asserting that it is true requires one to believe that they know something, and they have a good reason for believing it. How does one tussle with the fact that skeptics assert that they have knowledge simply by being skeptics?