I will do my best to summarize Gertler's argument for mind-body dualism: If we can conceive of an event, than it the event is possible. If two things are necessarily equal, than it would be impossible to conceive of one existing without the other. For example, we cannot conceive of water existing without H2O, and vice versa. Therefore, water = H2O. Physicalists believe that the mind is necessarily equal to the body. However, there are some cases in which we can conceive of the mind as being disembodied, or separate from the body. For example, we can conceive of ourselves experiencing pain while we are not actually experiencing that pain in our bodies. Thus, the mind is not necessarily equal to the body, and dualism is true.
After much rumination on Gertler's argument, I realized that it corresponds with my own justification for my belief in dualism. I can certainly conceive of my mind existing without the presence of my body. Through meditation I can imagine my mind, or soul, observing my physical body from the outside. Thus, my mind is not necessarily equal to my body.
However, there is one objection to Gertler's argument that keeps nagging me. While we have proven that the mind is not necessarily equal to the body, we have perhaps not proven that the mind and the body are completely separate. What if the mind is contained inside of the brain, so that it is not necessarily the same as the brain, but it still could not exist without it? As far as I can see, Gertler does not provide a rebuttal to this objection. If you, the reader, have an opinion concerning this objection, whether it is for or against it, I would love to hear it!
- Adam Nick
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